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Documents authored by Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley

Document
Complete Volume
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022
OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Aggelos Kiayias, and Marianne Verdier

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume
Cite as

4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 1-82, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@Proceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022,
  title =	{{OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{1--82},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184169},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022},
  annote =	{Keywords: OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume}
}
Document
Front Matter
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Aggelos Kiayias, and Marianne Verdier

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization
Cite as

4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 0:i-0:xii, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  title =	{{Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{0:i--0:xii},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184172},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0},
  annote =	{Keywords: Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4
On Fairness in Committee-Based Blockchains

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 82, 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020)

Abstract
Committee-based blockchains are among the most popular alternatives of proof-of-work based blockchains, such as Bitcoin. They provide strong consistency (no fork) under classical assumptions, and avoid using energy-consuming mechanisms to add new blocks in the blockchain. For each block, these blockchains use a committee that executes Byzantine-fault tolerant distributed consensus to decide the next block they will add in the blockchain. Unlike Bitcoin, where there is only one creator per block, in committee-based blockchain any block is cooperatively created. In order to incentivize committee members to participate in the creation of new blocks, rewarding schemes have to be designed. In this paper, we study the fairness of rewarding in committee-based blockchains and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the system communication under which it is possible to have a fair reward mechanism.
Cite as

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. On Fairness in Committee-Based Blockchains. In 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 82, pp. 4:1-4:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{On Fairness in Committee-Based Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:15},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-157-3},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{82},
  editor =	{Anceaume, Emmanuelle and Bisi\`{e}re, Christophe and Bouvard, Matthieu and Bramas, Quentin and Casamatta, Catherine},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-135261},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Consensus, Committee, Fairness, Proof-of-Stake, Reward, Selection}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.12
Rational Behaviors in Committee-Based Blockchains

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Bruno Biais, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 184, 24th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2020)

Abstract
We study the rational behaviors of participants in committee-based blockchains. Committee-based blockchains rely on specific blockchain consensus that must be guaranteed in presence of rational participants. We consider a simplified blockchain consensus algorithm based on existing or proposed committee-based blockchains that encapsulate the main actions of the participants: voting for a block, and checking its validity. Knowing that those actions have costs, and achieving the consensus gives rewards to committee members, we study using game theory how strategic participants behave while trying to maximize their gains. We consider different reward schemes, and found that in each setting, there exist equilibria where blockchain consensus is guaranteed; in some settings however, there can be coordination failures hindering consensus. Moreover, we study equilibria with trembling participants, which is a novelty in the context of committee-based blockchains. Trembling participants are rational that can do unintended actions with a low probability. We found that in presence of trembling participants, there exist equilibria where blockchain consensus is guaranteed; however, when only voters are rewarded, there also exist equilibria where validity can be violated.
Cite as

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Bruno Biais, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. Rational Behaviors in Committee-Based Blockchains. In 24th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 184, pp. 12:1-12:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.12,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Biais, Bruno and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{Rational Behaviors in Committee-Based Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{24th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2020)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-176-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{184},
  editor =	{Bramas, Quentin and Oshman, Rotem and Romano, Paolo},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-134973},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2020.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: BFT Consensus, Blockchains, Game Theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16
Correctness of Tendermint-Core Blockchains

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 125, 22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018)

Abstract
Tendermint-core blockchains (e.g. Cosmos) are considered today one of the most viable alternatives for the highly energy consuming proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Their particularity is that they aim at offering strong consistency (no forks) in an open system combining two ingredients (i) a set of validators that generate blocks via a variant of Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant (PBFT) consensus protocol and (ii) a selection strategy that dynamically selects nodes to be validators for the next block via a proof-of-stake mechanism. The exact assumptions on the system model under which Tendermint underlying algorithms are correct and the exact properties Tendermint verifies, however, have never been formally analyzed. The contribution of this paper is as follows. First, while formalizing Tendermint algorithms we precisely characterize the system model and the exact problem solved by Tendermint, then, we prove that in eventual synchronous systems a modified version of Tendermint solves (i) under additional assumptions, a variant of one-shot consensus for the validation of one single block and (ii) a variant of the repeated consensus problem for multiple blocks. These results hold even if the set of validators is hit by Byzantine failures, provided that for each one-shot consensus instance less than one third of the validators is Byzantine.
Cite as

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. Correctness of Tendermint-Core Blockchains. In 22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 125, pp. 16:1-16:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{Correctness of Tendermint-Core Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018)},
  pages =	{16:1--16:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-098-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{125},
  editor =	{Cao, Jiannong and Ellen, Faith and Rodrigues, Luis and Ferreira, Bernardo},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-100764},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Consensus, Proof-of-Stake, Fairness}
}
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